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Halpern (1998) proposed a four-component model for promoting the transfer of critical
thinking. One of them, the “structural component,” focuses on how to organize teaching
so that critical thinking skills can be generalized. Here, we assess the efficiency of that
type of organization. Thus, one group of university students received instruction following
the suggestions specified in that component and their performance was compared with
that of other university students who received instruction in the same skills but using a
different procedure, and with that of a control group. In comparison with the control
group, the performance of both instructed groups was better after training. However, no
significant differences were observed between either instruction group; both forms of
instruction afforded very similar results.  
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Halpern (1998) propuso un modelo de cuatro componentes para promocionar la
transferencia del pensamiento crítico. Uno de ellos, el “componente estructural”, se centra
en cómo organizar la enseñanza para que las habilidades del pensamiento crítico puedan
generalizarse. En este trabajo, evaluamos la eficiencia de este tipo de organización. Así,
un grupo de estudiantes universitarios recibieron instrucción siguiendo las sugerencias
especificadas en ese componente y su ejecución se comparó con la de otro grupo de
estudiantes universitarios que recibieron instrucción en las mismas habilidades pero
usando un procedimiento diferente, y con la de un grupo control. En comparación con
el grupo control, la ejecución de ambos grupos instruidos fue mejor después del
entrenamiento. Sin embargo, no se observaron diferencias significativas entre los dos
grupos de instrucción; ambas formas de instrucción produjeron resultados muy similares.
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Improving critical thinking is undoubtedly one of the
priority objectives of education at all levels. To train young
people to be able to analyze, assess, judge, and construct
information critically is just one of the challenges faced by
educators in the 21st century. The broad consensus regarding
the importance of critical thinking and the desire to improve
it contrasts with the lack of critical thought about its
conceptualization and how it should be taught.
In this sense, despite innumerable efforts that have been
made to establish a clear and precise definition of critical
thinking, none has been widely accepted. Some of the best
known efforts are, for example, the proposal by  McPeck
(1981), who defined critical thinking as “The skill and
propensity to engage in an activity with reflective
skepticism” (p. 7) or that of Ennis (1987), who defines it
as “reasonable, reflective thinking that it focused on deciding
what to believe or  do” (p.10), whereas for Lipman (2003),
critical thinking is thinking that facilitates the undertaking
of good judgments within and by criteria; it is self-correcting
and sensitive to context. The nature of critical thinking is
indeed so complex that it is not easy to synthesize it in a
single definition, although such definitions do allow us to
sketch some of its most important characteristics: skills,
dispositions, reasoning, self-correction, judgments, decisions,
beliefs, etc.
There is also much debate about whether the skills of
critical thinking are general or, in contrast, they are specific
and content-dependent. McPeck (1981, 1990) was one of
the first to question the concept of critical thinking as a
general skill, independent of content. He maintains that
there are no generalizable thinking skills and considers
that thinking is always “thinking about something” so that
it is not possible to teach “thinking in general”; curricular
disciplines are the best way to improve critical thinking
and hence it should be taught within the various academic
disciplines. This stance has been criticized by other authors
(e.g., Govier, 1987; Paul, 1990; Siegel, 1990) who adopt
the opposite position; that is, in defense of some general
principles of critical thinking that can be taught
independently of disciplines or specific areas of
knowledge.
The main reason why people have gone against general
courses on critical thinking (Brown, 1997; Glaser, 1984;
Kurfiss, 1988; McPeck, 1981, 1990; Perkins, 1987) is due
to the difficulty in achieving the transfer of skills learned
in other domains, contents, or situations. Nevertheless, this
is not a problem exclusive to general courses but also for
the critical thinking disciplinary approach, as there are no
guarantees that the skills of this, taught in a given
discipline—say, History—will be applicable to another
discipline—for example, a Science subject. In fact, one of
the major difficulties inherent to programs designed to teach
critical thinking is how to organize the teaching so that what
has been learnt can be applied beyond the learning situation,
in other contexts or in other situations.
It is widely agreed in the literature (Kennedy, Fisher, &
Ennis, 1991) that the transfer of critical thinking from one
domain to another is desirable and that approaches to teaching
critical thinking should be designed to foster such transfer. In
this sense, Halpern (1998) proposed a model for promoting
the transcontextual learning of the skills of critical thinking
so that the probability that these will be applied in real life,
outside the class situation in which they were learned, is
increased. The model is made up of four components. In the
first two, Halpern specifies what to teach to improve critical
thinking. In the other two, she offers a procedure for instruction;
that is, how to organize the teaching so that what is taught is
really learned and applied when the situation in hand so
requires. Let us take a brief look at each of these components.
1. Instruction in and practice with the critical thinking
skills. Halpern proposes the following category of
skills for guiding instruction: (a) verbal reasoning,
(b) analysis of arguments, (c) confirmation of
hypothesis, (d) probability and uncertainty, and (e)
decision making and problem solving.
2. Disposition to engage in a difficult type of thinking
and its learning. It is important to distinguish between
the capacity for thinking critically and the disposition
to apply such skills. Some people may have great
skills and yet lack the disposition to apply them and,
hence, the dispositional component is very important.
Among the dispositions pointed out by Halpern are
the following: (a) the disposition to become committed
and persist in a complex task, (b) a common tendency
to forge plans and suppress impulsive activity, (c)
flexibility and impartiality, and (d) the disposition to
abandon unproductive strategies, etc.
3. The structural component to promote transfer. The
final aim of teaching critical thinking is not only that
students be able to understand and use the skills or
strategies taught but also that they become able to
use them in new situations when necessary. That is,
there should be transfer or generalization of what has
been learned in the class context to other situations.
Halpern considers the problem of transfer as one of
memory, as what is recalled depends on what happens
in the learning process. Accordingly, Halpern suggests
that learning should be organized so that it will not
depend on content in order to facilitate the recovery
of skills. With this in mind, she offers the following
suggestions: (a) make the structural aspects of
problems and arguments as relevant as possible so
that learning them will not depend on the content;
(b) encourage  practice with different classes of
examples; have the students do exercises and tasks
similar to those found in the real world; (c) offer
corrective feedback to develop the habit of “becoming
aware spontaneously;” and (d) promote effective
elaboration of information in memory, for example,
by the use of organization so that interconnected
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knowledge structures can be developed (the use of
reflexive questions is a technique that can help
achieve this) that will be similar to those found in
daily contexts.
4. The last of the four components is meta-cognition,
in which it is suggested that students should be faced
with a series of issues to help them to convert implicit
cognitive processes into explicit ones.
As stated, Halpern proposes this model for the teaching
of critical thinking to promote its transfer across the
different domains. Although the final goal of all instruction
programs is transfer, its assessment (Perkins & Grotzer,
1997; Saiz, 2002) requires certain prior steps. Thus, before
assessing the degree of transfer of an instruction program,
it will be necessary to demonstrate that it produces some
kind of improvement in the skill taught; that is, we must
measure the magnitude of the change. Second, we must
see whether the change persists over time, what is called
(Perkins & Grotzer, 1997) the degree of permanence.
Finally, it is necessary to assess whether the change
observed is also produced in situations other than the
teaching circumstance; that is, whether there has been
transfer.
In the present work, our main aims are, first, to assess
the efficiency of a general program for the improvement
of critical thinking and, second, to evaluate the magnitude
of the change produced by the “structural component” to
foster the transfer, proposed by Halpern (1998). To achieve
these aims, we developed a program for improving critical
thinking in which we taught the following skills: (a) analysis
and evaluation of daily arguments; (b) deduction and
induction; (c) probability and uncertainty, and (d) decision
making. Within the procedure for improving these skills
we included the suggestions set forth in the structural
component to promote transfer, proposed by Halpern and
described above. This program was applied to a group of
university students (the structural group), whose
performance was compared with that of another group of
university students to whom the same skills were taught
but with a procedure that did not include the suggestions
of the structural component (the nonstructural group), and
with that of a control group who did not receive any type
of instruction in critical thinking.
We formulated the following hypotheses: First, if the
students are instructed in critical thinking (the structural and
nonstructural groups), at the end of the treatment period,
their performance should be better than that of the group
that did not receive any kind of instruction (control group).
Our second hypothesis was that if the students were instructed
in critical thinking by means of the structural component
approach (the structural group), which improves the
conditions for learning critical thinking, at the end of the
instruction period, they should show a  better performance
than those who received the instruction without this procedure
(the nonstructural group)
Method
Participants
The definitive sample comprised 112 students with a
mean age of 21.8 years from the third and fourth years of
a Psychology degree (104 women and 8 men). The fourth-
year students participated in one of the two instruction
conditions, while those from the third year served as controls
and received only the pre- and posttests, with no type of
instruction in thinking during the period between both tests
(8 months). Choice of the fourth-year students as the
treatment group was based on academic reasons because in
that year, the students take courses whose practical activities
we could use for carrying out the instruction. Within this
group, the students were randomly designated to one of the
two experimental conditions. Despite the difference of one
academic year between the control group and the two
experimental groups, prior analysis of the means of the
dependent variables allowed us to observe that there were
no significant differences among them, so that starting level
was the same for all of them. Accordingly, the groups could
be considered perfectly comparable.
The sample in each group comprised 42 students who
received the structural instruction, 36 who received training
without that structural procedure, and 34 who served as
controls.
Treatment
In the two groups of instruction, the same skills were
taught. Generically, they were as follows: skills in analysis
and evaluation of daily arguments; deductive (categorical
and propositional) skills and inductive (causal, analogical
and generalizations) skills, probability and uncertainty, and
decision making (definition of the framework problem of
the decision, the search for and evaluation of information,
establishing conclusions and improvement of feedback).
Both groups received the teaching of critical thinking in the
same number of sessions (23 sessions of one hour weekly),
with the same schedule and the same instructor. All students
attended at least 90% of the sessions and had to hand in the
tasks required; apparently this did not pose any problems
for them. The instructor was the first author of this work. 
However, the instruction procedure was different for
each group and this is what really determined each of the
experimental conditions.
Structural group: The instructors explained the skill
being taught and, to do so, they used a greater number of
examples of arguments, and strong emphasis was placed on
the structural aspects of such arguments so that learning
this skill would not depend on the content but on the
structure. Following this, the students did exercises and
tasks. In order to increase the amount of practice they were
doing, a greater number of exercises were included than in
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the other (nonstructural) group; also, these exercises were
more realistic and similar to those found in the real world.
The tasks performed by the students were collected and
corrected by the instructor. This allowed us to analyze and
assess the degree of understanding and learning achieved
by the students. All participants received an analysis and
assessment of their own work. Correction was completed
with an overall feedback to the whole class in which the
instructor explained all the doubts and mistakes in
understanding, and the difficulties observed were clarified.
In other words, the students received a corrective feedback
about their learning and the knowledge they had gained.
This technique is very similar to one of the Classroom
Assessment Techniques (CATs) remarked by Angelo (1995)
known as “Minute paper,” which this author suggests could
be used to improve meta-cognition. We used it with two
goals in mind: first, that the students should have feedback
about their performance and, second, that this would allow
them to improve their meta-cognitive knowledge. In
synthesis, this group received instruction following the
suggestions gathered within Halpern’s (1998) structural
component as a way to improve learning.
Nonstructural group. In this group, the instructors
explained the skill to be learned. They simply explained
what the students had to do, placing less emphasis on the
structure of the arguments and situations typically related
to that skill. In other words, no reference was made to the
structural characteristics of the arguments. The number of
examples offered was lower than in the structural group.
Following this, the students did exercises and tasks, whose
number was also smaller than in the structural group and
they were more “formal” or “academic” and less related to
daily situations. The students performed these exercises
through an interactive program developed by us
(http://web.usal.es/~emid/pips/pips.htm—the access keys for
each block can be consulted in Appendix A). As they were
performing the exercises, the computers gave them feedback
about their performance, in the sense of whether the answers
were correct or incorrect, but no explanation was given as
to what they had done wrong or why it was incorrect. Thus,
they were offered immediate feedback but this was not
corrective. Accordingly, the students from this group were
working the skills with no emphasis on structural aspects,
with few examples, with less practice, with fewer common
daily situations, and with noncorrective feedback.
Control group. The students in this group did not receive
any kind of instruction in critical thinking either within or
outside their curricular activities, and they only performed
the pretest and the posttest.
Evaluation Instruments and Correction Criteria
To determine whether the instruction improved critical
thinking, we decided to apply several tests. Thus, we chose
a standardized test such as the Cornell-Level Z Test (Ennis
& Millman, 1985), which provides information about the
main critical thinking skills such as deduction, induction,
credibility, etc.  However, this test does not assess the
decision-making skill, so we decided to elaborate an
instrument for this. Another very important skill in critical
thinking, which is not evaluated directly in the Cornell Test
either, is that of analyzing and assessing arguments,
essentially informal ones. Therefore, we developed a
Reasoning Test so that this aspect would also be covered.
Finally, we applied the Knowledge Test as a complementary
one; this would provide us with information about the beliefs
about and attitudes towards thinking. They are described in
some detail below.
In the pretest, the following assessment instruments were
used:
The Cornell Critical Thinking Test – level Z, (Ennis &
Millman, 1985), which comprises 52 items with three
alternative answers to each. It evaluates the following skills:
induction, deduction, observation, credibility, assumptions,
and meaning. The main purpose of this test is to obtain a
standardized measure of critical thinking. The test has a
reliability of .78.
Knowledge Test. This comprises 80 questions with true-
false answers. The items were the issues raised by Halpern
(2003) in the different chapters of her manual on critical
thinking. The aim of this test was to obtain a measure of
students’ beliefs about certain aspects and situations related
to thinking. Thus, the test evaluates certain ideas about
thinking skills, the use of certain strategies to think better,
and the perception or lack of perception of certain biases
or errors, etc. The reliability index is .65
Reasoning Test. We developed this instrument to assess
the skills of identification, analysis, and evaluation of
arguments. It comprises 10 texts, among which there are
arguments, sound or unsound, and nonarguments. For each
of the texts, the students were asked to state whether the
text was an argument; if it was, they had to identify the
conclusion and the reason(s) offered, and they had to make
an assessment of the argument, in the sense of whether they
agreed with it and why. The correction of this test was
carried out based on the following criteria: one point was
awarded if arguments were correctly differentiated from
nonarguments; if the conclusion was correctly identified,
two points were awarded; and for each reason correctly
identified, another point was awarded. For each additional
correctly assigned element (assumptions or counter-
arguments), another point was awarded. If the students
perceived relationships among the reasons, one, two, or three
points were awarded, depending on the difficulty. Finally,
if the students evaluated the argument correctly, two points
were awarded. The reliability index is .65.
Decision-Making Test. We also developed this
instrument to evaluate the main skills involved in decision-
making. It was made up of 21 problems, of which 20
aimed at evaluating Vulnerability to bias, and one
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evaluated the actual decision process. In the 20 problems
aimed at evaluating Vulnerability to bias, we posed
questions that would reflect the most typical errors
committed in decision-making. In particular, we evaluated
the following aspects: the construction of scenarios; the
framework of the decision; the heuristics of availability,
of representativeness, of anchoring and adjustment;
overconfidence, anchoring, and confirmatory bias. With
the exception of the questions exploring overconfidence
and regression to the mean, all were multiple-choice. The
correction criterion used for these questions was as
follows: if the students committed biases, they were
awarded 0 points and, if not, 1 point. The last question,
which evaluated the Decision-making process, was open.
The students were asked to explain how they would make
a decision. The aim was that they should at least specify
the main phases of the process (reflecting on what is
desired and defining the problem, searching for
information, generating alternatives, choosing one, and
assessing the choice and process used). Ultimately, this
question was not included in the final analyses, as it had
very low reliability indexes and negative correlations with
some of the measures. The reliability of the test, excluding
this question, is .42.
The correlations between these tests before instruction
ranged between .096 (p = .316) and .291 (p < .05). All
correlations were significant, with the exception of the
former one, corresponding to the correlation between the
Reasoning Test and the Cornell Test which, as seen, was
nonsignificant.
At posttest, we applied the same tests: Cornell Test
(Cronbach’s  α = .73), Knowledge Test (Cronbach’s α =
.64); for the Reasoning Test and the Decision-making Test,
parallel forms were applied, and the respective reliability
indexes were .63 and .61. 
The correlations between the posttests were between
.165 and .471. All were significant, with the exception (as
at pretest) of that obtained between the Reasoning Test and
the Cornell Test, which was nonsignificant (r = .165, p =
.08),
The correlations between pretest and posttest measures
were: .426 (p < .01) for the Cornell Test,  .401 (p < .01)
for the Knowledge Test, .294 (p < .01) for Vulnerability to
Bias Test, and .155 (p = .103) for the Reasoning Test.
Procedure
One week before starting the instruction, we applied the
pretest exercises to all the students, and one week after it
had been completed, the posttest was implemented. For both
instruction groups—structural and nonstructural—critical
thinking was taught over 23 weeks, at one hour per week.
In both groups, the time dedicated to each of the skills was
exactly the same, the only difference being the way of
teaching.
Results
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the
three groups: structural, nonstructural, and control, for each
of the dependent variables before and after instruction. As
the control group included students from one academic year
lower than those in the two groups receiving instruction,
we decided to perform a single-factor ANOVA to verify that
there were no differences among the three groups before
treatment. The results showed that all three groups had a
similar result in critical thinking as evaluated with the
Cornell Test, F(2, 109) = 0.45, p = .63;  their knowledge of
critical thinking, as evaluated by the Knowledge Test, F(2,
109) = 0.157, p = .85; in the number of biases committed,
assessed by the Vulnerability to Bias Test, F(2, 109) = 1.68,
p = .19; and in the Reasoning Test, F(2, 109)  = 2.42, p =
.094. Once we had verified that all the students had a similar
level in these critical thinking skills, we evaluated the quality
of the instruction.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the two methods for
teaching critical thinking in comparison with the control
group, we performed a multiple analysis of covariance,
Table 1
Pre-Posttest Means and Standard Deviations
Cornell Test
Pretest Posttest
GROUPS M (SD) M (SD)
Control 15.29 (6.18) 16.64 (5.13)
Structural 17.21 (6.67) 19.41 (6.57)
Nonstructural 16.18 (5.95) 19.63 (6.87)
Knowledge Test
Pretest Posttest
M (SD) M (SD)
Control 25.91 (9.23) 26.06 (8.35)
Structural 26.38 (8.14) 34 (9.96)
Nonstructural 27.06 (8.52) 33.53 (9.72)
Reasoning Test
Pretest Posttest
M (SD) M (SD)
Control 3.77(1.37) 2.42 (1.10)
Structural 4.22 (1.66) 6.95 (1.93)
Nonstructural 4.60 (1.62) 5.85(1.75)
Vulnerability to Bias
Pretest Posttest
M (SD) M (SD)
Control 6.35 (2.159) 8.21 (1.68)
Structural 7.1 (1.81) 11.69 (1.90)
Nonstructural 7.03 (1.69) 11.22 (2.05)
incorporating the scores from the pretest as covariates so
that we would be able to control the effect of undesired
factors that might affect this quasi-experimental design. The
analyses carried out using the Levene test and the Box test
confirmed that the variances were homogeneous.
The analyses confirmed that, after the instruction, the
means of the three groups differed significantly, Wilks’ λ =
0.436, F(4, 102) = 32.96, p < .01, η2 = 0.564, Power = 1.
With the univariate contrasts, we observed that the
differences among them occurred in the four dependent
variables: in the Cornell Test, F(6, 105)  = 5.50; p <  .01;
η2 = 0.239, Power = 0.99; in the Knowledge Test, F(6, 105)
= 8.98, p < .01, η2 = 0.339; Power = 1; in the Vulnerability
to Bias Test, F(6, 105)  = 14.98, p < .01, η2 = 0.460, Power
= 1; and in the Reasoning Test,  F(6, 105)  =  24.06, p <
.01, η2 = 0.579, Power = 1.
The univariate tests revealed that, in the Cornell test,
significant differences were seen between the nonstructural
group and the control group, but not between the
structural group and the control group. Accordingly, the
instruction based on Halpern’s theoretical principles did
not lead to more improvement of the students’ results
than in the group not receiving instruction; both displayed
a similar performance. Nor were any difference observed
between both types of instruction: structural and
nonstructural.
However, in the Knowledge Test, we did observe
statistically significant differences between both types of
instruction and the control group, so that the students who
had received instruction in critical thinking using both the
structural and the nonstructural approaches, proved to have
a better level in their knowledge of critical thinking than
those who did not receive instruction. Nevertheless, and
contrary to our predictions, the structural group did not
show better results than the nonstructural group, that is,
instruction based on Halpern’s principles did not contribute
to an improvement in knowledge about thinking.
Regarding Vulnerability to Bias, we observed that the two
groups that had received instruction in critical thinking
had better results than the group that did not receive any
type of instruction.  In other words, they committed fewer
biases and mistakes, although again it was observed that
the group that received structural instruction did not show
a greater decrease in the number of biases than those who
received nonstructural instruction. Regarding this
dependent variable, the instruction according to Halpern’s
theoretical model did not produce better learning either.
Finally, in the context of the Reasoning Test, both
instruction groups showed significant differences with
respect to the group not receiving any type of intervention
and, additionally, the students who received instruction
according to Halpern’s suggestions demonstrated better
skills in analysis and the assessment of arguments than
the group that received instruction not incorporating her
theoretical suggestions.
Discussion
Overall, our first hypothesis was confirmed. That is, the
two groups that received instruction in critical thinking
obtained better results than the control group, with the
exception that, in the Cornell Test, the structural group
displayed the same learning as the control group. As regards
the other dependent variables, the students receiving
instruction performed better than the group that did not
receive it. Accordingly, instruction in critical thinking,
following either of the two teaching procedures, was
effective, although with respect to the Cornell Test, the
nonstructural instruction was more effective.  However, the
second hypothesis was only partially confirmed. Thus, the
students who received the structural instruction scored higher
than those who received nonstructural instruction only on
the Reasoning Test, but not as regards the other dependent
variables. Accordingly, we can confirm that, at least at short-
term, instruction that emphasizes the structural aspects of
arguments, with a greater number of exercises similar to
those found in daily life, and that provides corrective
feedback, does not produce greater improvements than
teaching critical thinking without such characteristics.
The students subjected to instruction in critical thinking
displayed better skills in this after the instruction, whereas
the control group did not improve in this respect. This was
not the case of the Cornell Test, in which the group that
received instruction following Halpern’s theoretical principles
did not show improved learning compared with the control
group. We do not have a clear explanation for this. In this
sense, our results are also similar to those obtained in other
attempts to improve thinking, such as those obtained with
the Intelligence Project (Hernstein, Nickerson, Sánchez, &
Swets, 1986) and those obtained with Productive Thinking
(Treffinger, Speedie, & Bruner, 1974) as the gains achieved
by the groups receiving instruction were not revealed in all
the measures. Specifically, the greatest gains in the instructed
groups occurred in the tests designed by the authors to
evaluate the skills taught, whereas in the standardized tests,
the gains were smaller. In other words, this seems to be very
commonplace in attempts to improve thinking and leads us
to another series of issues. Are such tests really sensitive to
the changes that are assumed to occur when instruction in
thinking is taught? It may be that our instruments were
flawless as regards their psychometric characteristics but
were unable to detect the change; that is, they were
insensitive to it. In fact, some authors (Ennis, 2003; Govier,
1987) have reported that multiple-choice tests might not be
the ideal way to evaluate thinking. Instruction produces a
series of changes in the thinking process that may be difficult
to detect with a multiple-choice format. It seems that the
best way to evaluate thinking is through open questions, in
which students have to justify their point of view (Ennis,
2003). Nevertheless, and for this reason they are less
frequently used, such tests are much more costly to correct.
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In fact, with a view to solving certain problems detected in
traditional tests on critical thinking, Halpern (2006) has
recently developed an instrument—the Halpern Critical
Thinking Assessment Using Everyday Situations—that is
currently being adapted to the Spanish population and that
combines two response formats: open and closed. The test
is promising, although some time will be required before
we can see how it really works. In synthesis, what does
seem clear is that much more empirical work is required to
determine whether the partial improvements observed are
due to the instruction procedures, which failed to improve
some skills, or to a problem with the assessment instruments
that were insensitive to the changes.
Another aspect to be addressed is the absence of
significant differences between the two instruction groups,
as differences were only seen between them on the Reasoning
Test, but not in the other dependent variables. Does this mean
that instruction with Halpern’s method is not more effective?
First, it should be recalled that the recommendations made
by Halpern (1998)—highlighting the importance of doing a
lot of practice, with examples and exercises similar to those
found in real life, underlining the structural aspects of
arguments so that their learning will not depend on the
content, and offering appropriate feedback—are aimed at
promoting the transfer of thinking skills to contexts other
than those explored in the instruction. Thus, it is possible
that the instruction given to the structural group, which
received instruction according to this approach, might not
elicit short-term improvements, although the improvements
gained would be longer lasting and would become manifest
more clearly in daily contexts. That is, there would be greater
transfer. Nevertheless, this possibility, related to a potentially
greater persistence and a greater transfer, must be evaluated
empirically. The assessment of a program aimed at improving
thinking (Perkins & Grotzer, 1997; Saiz, 2002) begins with
the demonstration of its immediate effects, and indeed this
was our main goal here. And only when the change has been
demonstrated is it possible to evaluate the degree of
persistence and, finally, the degree of generalization.
However, regarding our results, the fact that the structural
group displayed better skills in analysis and the evaluation
of arguments, assessed in the Reasoning test, is a small proof
of an immediate effect although, as stated above, it would
be necessary to verify whether such efficacy persists in the
long term and in other situations.
Nevertheless, it is also necessary to consider the gains
obtained by the nonstructural group, which received
instruction in critical thinking without application of
Halpern’s principles, in a positive light. The change observed
in this group is relevant because it is proof that it is indeed
possible to improve this type of thinking with a computer
program and without directed, supervised instruction. This
evidently implies a huge saving in time and energy. In fact,
one work (Halpern, 2006) revealed improvements in critical
thinking after this was taught on the web. Nevertheless, as
we have seen, it would be necessary to go deeper into the
practical significance of the change and the persistence and
generalizability of its effects. 
To conclude, in contrast to some reviews (Ten Dam &
Volman, 2004; Tsui, 1999) in which the authors highlight
the few positive results of instruction in critical thinking
and question the possibility of improving it by means of
general courses, we believe that our modest results are
promising and offer some evidence, although for the short-
term, of the possibility of improving critical thinking with
this general procedure. Moreover, whereas there are more
reliable evaluation instruments, we feel we should continue
searching for new and better evaluation instruments in order
to be able to evaluate the skills we consider important in
critical thinking but which have not been included in any
standardized test available to date.
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APPENDIX A
Access to the simple critical thinking program:
Internet site: http://web.usal.es/~emid/pips/pips.htm
Once the site has been entered, click on “Subject” (tema) and, in “Subject,” select “Thinking” (pensamiento), in which
the corresponding topics appear. Access to each one requires codes, as below:
• Practical or informal reasoning: p67e45; pu84dt (with solutions)
• Syllogistic reasoning:htbs749
• Propositional reasoning:sirjt86
• Wason task: widkn10
• Inductive reasoning: dkring78.
Likewise, it is possible to access the decision-making block, except that this time, instead of selecting “thinking,” you
select “decision-making.” The access codes are as follows:
• Heuristics: 2000
• Probability: 1000
• Decision tables: 3456
